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Abstract In order to revamp Rhetoric as a methodological approach in Economics,
this paper combines natural selection in evolution and the psychology of confirmatory
bias. This latter can be thought of as a second best adaptation to the forces of natural
selection and can also be an evolutionary stable strategy so that it is here to stay as
seems to be supported by several psychological experiments. But once confirmatory
bias is at work it is quite clear that economic agents in general or scientists in partic-
ular do not act as perfectly rational in the sense that they do no mimic the behavior of
a Bayesian statistician. This combination has yielded three main results. First honest
and open, power-free, conversations may not preclude systematic error in appreciation
of theories. Therefore the moral constraint supposedly operating on the opinions of
scientists might not be binding in the sense that their opinions might look completely
anarchistic. Second the social constraint might also be not binding because each sci-
entist opinion carries the same weight regardless of fame or honor, a very postmodern
situation. Third, one can be a supporter of the correspondence theory of truth, one can
have no doubts about the existence of an independent underlying real world and yet
one might be obliged to accept that an honest and informed conversation may lead to
the acceptance of false theories.
For the last 30 years or so Salvador and I have talked Economics and we have worked together in trying to
build up a friendly atmosphere for its development and, more generally, for the development of science
policy at different levels. The underlying current of the present paper can be understood as my last move
of the chess game we are still playing around this scientific policy. I am grateful to David Teira and an
anonymous referee for helping me to shape this last version of my argument.
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Fundación Urrutia Elejalde, Fortuny 37,
Sotabanco, 28010 Madrid, Spain
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1 Introduction
The present paper should be considered as a constructive comment on the Rhetoric of
Economics intended to revamp it as an alternative methodological approach concerned
with the acceptance and rejection of economic theories through the consideration of
values and other rhetorical devices rather than objectivity. It is written from the stand-
point of a theoretical economist who tries to use current theories or models in selected
fields (biology and psychology) in order to clarify what this special brand of meth-
odology is saying. The Reflexivity typical of Economics, and other Social Sciences,
makes the distinction between Realism and Rhetoric rather problematic. On the one
hand in my “Realismo y Economía” Urrutia (2008). I tried to really close the debate
about Rhetoric and Realism opened twenty years before in Economics and Philos-
ophy, confronting two papers by Uskali Mäki.1 I argued then that, in Economics,
reality could be constructed from expectations, something completely unthinkable in
physics, say. The present paper shows, in addition, that Rhetoric cannot be associated
with a correspondence theory of truth. Therefore the necessity emerges of endowing
Rhetoric with some semantic force.2
I start by examining the debate between Uskali Mäki and Deirdre McCloskey in
the Journal of Economic Literature (1995), somehow summarized in a later paper by
Mäki (1999) and followed by a kind of addendum by him in the Journal of Economic
Issues Mäki (2000). I want to reflect upon Mäki’s diagnosis of McCloskey and his
proposals for her making sense and to do so, once again, from the stand-point of an
economist. But now the economics I want to rely upon is microtheoretical but neither
completely standard (in the sense that it will be influenced by biological and psycho-
logical ideas) nor alien to the present macro discussion. As will be seen, this essay
can then be taken as a second best exercise in an environment exhibiting less than
perfect rationality. This combination seems appropriate for the study of Rhetoric and
fits rather well the ontological constraint Mäki (2001) calls www (the “way the world
works”).3 The main finding is that, in spite of the fact that there are conditions under
which anarchism, postmodernism and realism are compatible among them, Rhetoric
is not always compatible with a correspondence theory of truth.
In the next section I summarize Mäki’s reconstruction and diagnosis of McCloskey
(1983) as well as his proposals to make sense of McCloskey. The reconstruction
1 I am referring here to Mäki (1988) and to Mäki (1996). In the latter he concentrated on the way Realism
can be understood in Economics. In the former Mäki tried to show the compatibility of Realism in general
and Rhetoric.
2 In Urrutia (2003) I tried to explain the semantic potential of Rhetoric understood in a certain “architec-
tural” way inspired by Sah and Stiglitz (1988).
3 Since in these two pieces I used economic theory they can be seen not only as comments on the Rhetoric
of Economics but also as articulating an essay within the Economics of Economics which can easily be
extended to the Economics of Science in general or to the Economies of Art and Culture in particular.
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is clear enough and the diagnosis claims that McCloskey is not an anarchist, not a
postmodernist and not a realist. These two operations—reconstruction and diagno-
sis—together with the proposals that follow, will allow me to establish my purpose
with greater precision. In the third section of the paper I deal with anarchism as an
epistemic strategy consisting in not paying attention to any moral or social constraints
in the acceptance or rejection of theories, i.e. “anything goes”. In order to legitimize
anarchism (or “anything goes”), I make use of a paper by Waldman (1994) on nat-
ural selection4 in evolution to conclude that the moral constraints usually imposed
on scientific conversation might have no bite, because the emergence of a systematic
error makes them impossible to grasp and, hence, apply. This is a result of interest in
itself and quite relevant for the discussion about the intellectual state of today’s mac-
roeconomics. In the fourth section I present some psychological experiments reported
by Rabin (1998) which can provide some grounds for taking seriously confirmatory
bias (specific kind of systematic error) as a primitive concept, and then I report on its
main implication: overconfidence. In this next section and in the following one I make
extensive use of Rabin and Schrag (1999).5 In the fifth section I use some of their
results on the implications of confirmatory bias (wrongness and no learning) to sug-
gest that one can be a realist and yet entertain a coherence theory of truth instead of a
correspondence theory of truth just because reality might not possibly be intellectually
grasped. In the sixth section I try to legitimize postmodernism. This is a vague notion
that here it is used, just like anarchism, only in its epistemic sense. Postmodernism is
the indifference between the purported quality of various opinions when it comes to
choosing between them. Following again Rabin and Schrag (1999), I recall some con-
ditions under which confirmatory bias could lead to discount the opinion of elites and
to count only on a kind of majority rule when considering problems of aggregation of
experts’ or scientists’ information, therefore legitimizing postmodernism. This is my
particular gift to Salvador since it touches on a topic becoming central to our ongoing
conversation. In the last section I conclude and offer some additional comments.
2 Mäki’s reconstruction and diagnosis of McCloskey
For the general purposes of the paper a summary of what is to be understood as Rhetoric
seems convenient. Since McCloskey is a clear writer but not very precise it is not easy
to pin down what she exactly means when pushing Rhetoric as a metatheory. There-
fore a certain reconstruction is necessary. I take Mäki’s reconstruction of McCloskey
(see Mäki (1995)) as my starting point because McCloskey seems to accept it at least
approximately in her reply (see McCloskey (1995)). Let us start then by the notion of
rhetoric, being understood from the beginning that Rhetoric (with big R) is the study
of rhetoric as applied to different fields. According to Mäki (1995).
4 See also for further discussion, Dobbs and Molho (1999); Robson (2002). Both continue the discussion
and offer additional references to the problem of the possible second best nature of evolutionary equilibria.
5 Psychologists usually refere to this phenomenon as confirmation bias: for a survey see Nickerson (1998)
where one can observe that psicologists call confirmation bias what I call here, following economists,
confirmatory bias.
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[R]hetoric is the use of arguments to persuade one’s audience in an honest
conversation […]. From this perspective, rhetoric is a social process which
involves (i) a persuader (speaker, writer); (ii) a persuadee or an audience (listener,
reader); (iii) the aim of the persuader to persuade the persuadee; (iv) argument as
the means to attain the aim (and) (v) honest conversation as the social channel of
persuasion. (p. 1303).
There is little doubt that every scientific discipline and every artistic or cultural
activity uses rhetoric. Therefore Rhetoric as the study of rhetoric has a broad scope
and a wide range of applications. I’ll focus here only on Economic Rhetoric, that is
on the study of rhetoric as it is used in Economics. This Rhetoric seems to me very
interesting and important for two reasons. In the first place because one way (perhaps
the only way) we have to select theories is by choosing the most plausible one, that is
by choosing that theory which we find most coherent with our present set of beliefs,
and secondly (and complementarily) because our beliefs are changed by (and perhaps
only by) rhetoric. The point is that coherence and plausibility are open notions quite
prone to be influenced by rhetorical devices. Consequently Rhetoric is closely related
to a coherence theory of justification which according to Mäki (1995) “suggests that
all beliefs are justified by their relations to other beliefs with which they cohere”. This
coherence theory of justification can be seen at work these days when discussing the
appropiateness of different macromodels for the understanding of the Great Recession.
Let us now turn to Mäki’s reconstruction of McCloskey’s theory of truth. This is
indeed a delicate matter. For a correspondence theory of truth a statement about reality
is true if it corresponds or fits with the real world. This notion of truth is clear but
“inoperational” since it does not provide any procedure to find truths. A coherence
theory of truth is, on the contrary, thoroughly “operational” because it provides in its
very name a procedure to ascertain the truthfulness of a statement, that it “coheres”
with other statements containing the main beliefs about the real world. The distinction
does not rely upon the belief, or lack of it, about the existence of an external world,
neither on the possibility or impossibility of skepticism. (Mäki, 1995, p. 1306) writes:
“the truth (with small t) of a statement consists of its coherence with a certain set of
beliefs that a privileged set of humans, obeying the cannons of Sprachethik end up with
in an ongoing conversation”. This is a coherence theory of truth. However McCloskey
qualifies this coherence theory of truth with social and moral constraints giving rise
to what Mäki calls an elite and angel theory of truth: only utterances coming from
“good economists” matter and, among those, attention should be paid only to the ones
reached in the process of an “honest” conversation.
Given this reconstruction Mäki’s diagnosis follows immediacy at least in negative
terms. McCloskey is not “an intellectual anarchist subscribing to a literal understand-
ing of the credo ‘anything goes’ with respect to economics” (p. 1311) because certainly
she proposes and tries to further moral and social constraints upon scientific conver-
sation. Neither is she a postmodernist philosopher for whom “all participants in any
conversation are on equal footing” (p. 1312), because she relies on elite’s opinions.
Finally McCloskey is not a “realist about truth” (p. 1312) even if she believes in the
existence of the independent reality of the world.
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Once reconstruction and diagnosis have been elaborated, Mäki indulges, naturally,
several proposals quite attuned to his own way of looking at these matters. Mäki
is a scientific realist (Mäki 1996) and therefore he dislikes a coherence theory of
truth, but quite independently of this, and just to make sense of McCloskey’s appar-
ently arbitrary claim that Economics was in good shape (at the time of their discus-
sion) he proposes to stick to a correspondence theory of truth and reserve angels
and elites for the coherence theory of justification at most keeping them apart from
any theory of truth and from Rhetoric itself. Let us look briefly at each of these
proposals.
As far as Rhetoric is concerned, this proposal implies that anarchism and postmod-
ernism cannot be excluded from Rhetoric. For a start, the absence of angels and elites
does not imply, by itself, that we should dispense with Rhetoric. I will have something
to add to this proposal. As for keeping angels and elites away from the theory of truth
seems quite obvious since they have nothing to do with truth when one entertains a
correspondence theory of truth. Nothing to add here. Finally Mäki proposes that at
most elites and angels could be included in the coherence theory of justification. I will
comment on that in the sequel.
The precise aim of in this paper (besides its: “celebrational” nature imposed by
the occasion) can now be stated. I want to study the reconstruction, diagnosis and
proposals I have just expounded in an environment (allowing for second best analysis
and bounded rationality) which exhibits confirmatory bias and seems to fit well the
undertones of Rhetoric. In this environment I want to make three broad comments.
In the first place I want to reinforce Mäki’s proposal of admitting anarchism and
postmodernism as part of Rhetoric. However this suggestion also makes reasonable
a coherence theory of truth even if one is a realist, something that Máki presum-
able would not like. In the second place I want to suggest that in the environment
studied angels and elites are, surprisingly, compatible with anarchism and postmod-
ernism casting doubts into Mäki’s diagnosis of McCloskey. In the third place, the
compatibility of anarchism, postmodernism and realism in the environment studied
makes use of angels and elites in the theory of justification something more doubt-
ful than Mäki seems to admit. I will, incidentally, also briefly express my doubts
about the possibility that elites and angels could make the market for ideas to run
smoothly.
3 Moral constraints (Sprachethik and Herrschaftsfreiheit)
These two notions within the parenthesis imply surely that scientific conversations
are honest attempts at persuasion which exclude both lying about findings or per-
sonal characteristics and the formation of coalitions to exercise power in matters
of justification. However, as we will now see these two traits might not exclude
systematic errors when judging the merits of a particular theory or when trying
to weigh one theory against another. The important point is that these systematic
errors might look as dishonest or mafia-like behavior, these latter expressions being
often heard or its content suggested in the present discussion of macroeconomic
matters.
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In the sequel Waldman (1994) ideas will be summarized showing that evolution
might lead to an equilibrium in which the above-mentioned systematic error will
appear. Let us then assume that at a point in time t of the evolutionary process there
are a continuum of scientists of unit mass and a continuum of scientific institutions of
unit mass. This is a technical assumption that should not bother as here. Both scientists
and institutions are characterized by a pair of parameters δ and γ, δ ∈ {δ1, . . . , δN }
γ ∈ {γ1, . . . , γN }. Now, for a scientist, δ ≥ 0 stands for the disutility of effort and, for
an institution, it stands for the disutility of effort it inoculates in any of its members.
Similarly we take γ to stand for the bias of a scientist in evaluating its own perfor-
mance and for the self-confidence an institution endows any of its members with. The
number and/or relevance of the contributions of scientist i is given by Fi = fi (ei , Ii )
a function of the effort s(he) chooses to make and of the quality of the institution s(he)
belongs to, where quality is a continuous variable. However the subjective estimation
of these contributions is given by F Ei = γi Fi , where indeed γi is the ith. scientist
bias or self-confidence. The utility of this scientist is given by Ui = γi Fi − δi ei .
Given some standard characteristics of the function f , which make effort and quality
of institution complementary, it is easy to understand that with any δ > 0, the effort
which maximizes utility is always smaller than the maximum possible effort e¯.
We now turn to the exploration of both natural selection and evolutionary processes.





and a proportion 1 − λ characterized by (δ′, γ ′).





tion (1 − λ) characterized by (δ′, γ ′). At t there are random pairings of scientists and
institutions and these pairings will determine the proportions of scientists character-
istics in the next generation. Let k(δ, γ ) be the number of “off-springs” which has a
scientist with characteristics (δ, γ ) under the forces of natural selection. Note that the
number of off-springs depends only on the characteristics of the scientist although the
characteristics these off-springs might have depend also on the institution the scientist
is paired with. Let K = λk(δˆ, γˆ ) + (1 − λ)k(δ′, γ ′). Then λˆ = λk(δˆ, γˆ )/K is the
proportion of scientist having characteristics (δˆ, γˆ ) in t + 1. When a scientist (δˆ, γˆ )
“mates” with an institution (δ′, γ ′) the inheritance yields λˆ/4 scientists of each of the
following pairs of characteristics: (δˆ, γˆ ), (δˆ, γ ′), (δ′, γˆ ), (δ′, γ ′).
We now turn to exploration of natural selection and the corresponding notion of
equilibrium. We say that (δˆ, γˆ ) is a first best adaptation if and only if
k(δˆ, γˆ ) ≥ k(δi , γ j ), ∀i, j.
Analogously (δˆ, γˆ ) is a second best adaptation if and only if
(i) k(δˆ, γˆ ) ≥ k(δi , γˆ ) ∀δi = δˆ and
(ii) k(δˆ, γˆ ) ≥ k(δˆ, γi ) ∀γi = γˆ .
It is very easy to find conditions under which the first best adaptation is unique
and implies δˆ = 0 and γˆ = 1 with no discounting and no bias in the judgment of
own merit. In this context the natural notion of equilibrium is Evolutionary Stable
Strategy (ESS) which occurs when a strategy, say (δ, γ ) is such that, if adopted by
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all members of the population, no mutant strategy could invade the population under
natural selection.
In order to formalize this notion of equilibrium in our context let (1 − λ) be the
proportion of scientists and institutions with characteristics (δˆ, γˆ ) and let λ be the
corresponding proportions with characteristics (δ′, γ ′). Then (δˆ, γˆ ) is ESS if ∃λ small
enough s. t., given any (δ′, γ ′), the (1 − λ) proportion of scientists characterized by
(δˆ, γˆ ) goes to 1 as t goes to ∞. The interesting point is that (δˆ > 0, γˆ > 1) can be a
second best adaptation (Waldman 1994, lemma 2) and that this second best adaptation
can also be ESS provided 3k(δˆ, γˆ ) > k(δi , γi ) ∀i, j (Waldman 1994, Proposition 4).6
The very general intuition of these results (the formal proof of which is indeed
in Waldman) is rather obvious. There are initial conditions in the form of population
proportions in the space of characteristics which are reinforced by the forces of natural
selection even when they are not the first best. As has been suggested the first best is
given by a level of effort e < e¯ and by absence of bias, γ = 1, which occurs when
δ = 0. As in any theory of second best if δ = 0 the second best solution does not
necessary involve γ = 1 but in general is associated with γ = 1.7
As far as Mäki’s first proposal is concerned the point of the exercise is to sug-
gest that the moral constraints of Sprachethik and Herrschaftsfreiheit might not be
binding in a very particular way. In the example examined the situation is free of
Herrschaft because the pairings are random and no coalitions are allowed to form for
the mutual promotion of a particular scientific theory or approach. The situation is
also such that Sprachethik is the rule since nobody hides its characteristics with some
strategic goal in mind. However some systematic error or overvaluation of own merit
might emerge through the forces of natural selection. If it does emerge we encounter
a social situation which is informationally equivalent to a situation in which scien-
tists strategically misrepresent their merits or connive with others to impose certain
theories.
Under this informational equivalence is not completely foolish to entertain an anar-
chistic attitude. Therefore this possibility reinforces Mäki’s proposal of admitting
anarchism in Rhetoric, not because it is realistic to do so but because even if it wasn’t
the situation might look as such and there might be no way of make believe that what
is going on is an honest and open discussion.
6 Note in passing that γˆ > 1 means systematic error. The possibility of such systematicity in committing
errors contradicts the underlying logic of the rational expectation hypothesis. That is, systematic errors (in
forecasting for example) can be detected and yet not to induce any revision. This seems relevant to present
day discussions.
7 The relationship between second best and evolution is interesting in itself but is also related to bounded
rationality. Evolution is blind, it proceeds, for instance, by random pairings, and not by organizing agents
in any optimal way. And it is precisely because it proceeds like this that evolution may fail to generate first
best selection. However the solutions it does generate are persistent if they are evolutionary stable just as
the QWERTY key board is persistent. But this persistence does not mean that strategies cannot change in
extreme circumstances like when uniting two different populations of approximately the same size. These
apparently stable strategies can also change unexpectedly when expectations have to be coordinated because
there might be multiple second best solutions.
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4 Confirmatory bias and overconfidence
That there might be systematic biases in the agents perceptions might be taken as a
theoretical curiosity. However psychological experiments reported by Rabin (1998)
seem to show quite clearly that in fact those biases are present in real life. Among
these experiments the ones which seem most congenial to my purpose here are the
ones referred to as confirmatory bias, a kind of bias which produces a certain belief
perseverance.
Experiment 1 (Lord, Ross and Lepper).
They asked 151 undergraduates to complete a questionnaire that included three
questions on capital punishment. Later, 48 of these students were recruited to par-
ticipate in another experiment. Twenty-four of them were selected because their
answers to the earlier questionnaire indicated that they were “ ‘proponents’ who
favored capital punishment, believed it to have a deterrent effect, and thought most
of the relevant research supported their own beliefs. Twenty-four were opponents
of capital punishment, doubted its deterrent effect and thought that the relevant
research supported their views”. These subjects were then asked to judge the
merits of randomly selected studies on the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty,
and to state whether a given study (along with criticisms of that study) provided
evidence for or against the deterrence hypothesis. Subjects were then asked to
rate, on 16 point scales ranging from −8 to +8, how the studies they had read
moved their attitudes toward the death penalty, and how they had changed their
beliefs regarding its deterrent efficacy. At confidence levels of p < 0.01 or stron-
ger, Lord, Ross, and Lepper found that proponents of the death penalty became
on average more in favor of the death penalty and believed more in its deterrent
efficacy, while opponents became even less in favor of the death penalty and
believed even less in its deterrent efficacy. (Rabin and Schrag 1999, p. 27).
Experiment 2 (Darley and Gross).
Seventy undergraduates were asked to assess a nine-year-old girl’s academic
skills in several different academic areas. Before completing this task, the stu-
dents received information about the girl and her family and viewed a video
tape of the girl playing in a playground. One group of subjects was given a fact
sheet that described the girl’s parents as college graduates who held white-collar
jobs; these students viewed a video of the girl playing in what appeared to be
a well-to-do suburban neighborhood. The other group of subjects was given a
fact sheet that described the girl’s parents as high school graduates who held
blue-collar jobs; these students viewed a video of the same girl playing in what
appeared to be an impoverished inner city neighborhood. Without being supplied
any more information, half of each group of subjects was then asked to evalu-
ate the girl’s reading level, measured in terms of equivalent grade level. There
was a small difference in the two groups’ estimates—those subjects who had
viewed the “inner-city” video rated the girl’s skill level at an average of 3.90
(i.e., 9/10 through 3rd grade) while those who had viewed the “suburban” video
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rated the girl’s skill level at an average of 4.29. The remaining subjects in each
group were shown a second video of the girl answering (with mixed success)
a series of questions. Afterwards, they were asked to evaluate the girl’s reading
level. The inner-city video group rated the girl’s skill level at an average of 3.71,
significantly below the 3.90 estimate of the inner-city subjects who did not view
the question-answer video. Meanwhile, the suburban video group rated the girl’s
skill level at an average of 4.67, significantly above the 4.29 estimate of the sub-
urban subjects who did not view the second video. Even though the two groups
viewed the identical question and answer video, the additional information fur-
ther polarized their assessments of the girl’s skill level. Darley and Gross (1983)
interpret this result as evidence of confirmatory bias-subjects were influenced by
the girl’s background in their initial judgments, but their beliefs were evidently
influenced even more strongly by the effect their initial hypotheses had on their
interpretation of further evidence (Rabin 1998, pp. 27–28).
These two experiments show a psychological phenomenon called polarization which
occurs according to the first impressions received by agents. This polarization might
turn into confirmatory bias, a psychological trait especially well described by Lord,
Ross and Lepper:
With confirming evidence, we suspect that both lay and professional scientists
rapidly reduce the complexity of the information and remember only a few well-
chosen supportive impressions. With disconfirming evidence, they continue to
reflect upon any information that suggests less damaging “alternative interpreta-
tions”. Indeed, they may even come to regard the ambiguities and conceptual flaws
in the data opposing their hypotheses as somehow suggestive of the fundamental
correctness of those hypotheses (Rabin 1998, p. 28).
It should also be reported that experience and learning do not necessarily eliminate
confirmatory bias, it may even exacerbate the problem as several experiments reported
by Rabin (1998) show. This is particularly so among “experts who have rich models
of the system in question”. Rabin continues: “indeed many authors have hypothesized
the role of reasoning process itself in exacerbating the confirmatory bias”.
This confirmatory bias seems to be specially important under the following condi-
tion: (i) ambiguity of the evidence, (ii) abstract character of the situation, (iii) necessity
of interpretation of the evidence on the situation and (iv) previous reasoning. These
conditions are clearly present in the Social Sciences in general and in Economics in
particular. They are all pervasive in art and culture but clearly absent in the natural
sciences (or are they?) where only the fourth is applicable.
Let us now formalize the consequences of confirmatory bias. In this section we
focus attention on how it leads to overconfidence (Fact 1). In the next two sections
we will try to understand its eventual consequences for the pursuit of truth (however
defined): Fact 2 (wrongness) and Fact 3 (no learning).
At this point we just prepare the stage for further analysis. Let us focus then on a
particular agent, a scientist say, and let x be a particular theory. This theory x ∈ {A, B}
and x = A means “x is true” and x = B means “x is false”. For the moment it is not
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necessary to specify what kind of theory of truth we stick to. Our scientist has an a priori
belief over the set {A, B} which can be written as prob(x = A) = prob(x = B) = 0.5.
At each t, t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , the scientist receives a signal st , independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d), which is correlated with the true state of the world, A or B.
This signal st ∈ {a, b}. Since we do not specify whether “true” means “coherent” with
other theories or “faithful” to the real world the interpretation of st can go from the
reaction to the presentation of x to an educated audience at a seminar to the result of an
experiment specially designed to ascertain the correspondence of the content of x with
some trait of reality. But now, the signal st is not perfect and its “correctedness” can
be measured by ϑ = prob(st = a/A) = prob(st = b/B) ∈ (0.5, 1). Note that since
ϑ = 1 we are in a context which can be called in very broad teems as one of second
best. Furthermore at each t the scientist does not perceive st but rather σt ∈ {α, β} and
this perception may misinterpret the signal more or less depending on the “severity”
of the confirmatory bias. For simplicity let as assume that only those signals which
conflict with a priori beliefs are misinterpreted and let us denote by q the probability
of misreading a conflicting signal.
At each point in time the scientist updates his a priori beliefs according to the sig-
nals perceived. It is not very difficult to establish now a certain relationship between
the “correctness” of the signal, ϑ , and the “severity” of the confirmatory bias, q, at
stage t of the updating process. For so doing let st−1 = (s1, s2, . . . , st−1) and let











x = B/σ t−1) > 0.5, x = A
)
i.e. the probability that the scientist misreads the evidence at t given that the previous











x = B/σ t−1) > 0.5, x = B
)
i.e. the probability that the scientist reads correctly the evidence at t given that the
previous evidence (may be read correctly or may be misread) has led him to entertain
the right belief. It is now very simple to establish that8
ϑ∗ = (1 − ϑ) + qϑ
ϑ∗∗ = ϑ + q(1 − ϑ)
8 For example let θ∗ be the probability of my misreading the signal α when B is the case but I take A to be
the case because it is supported by previous evidence. It is given by the probability that the signal is correct,
ϑ , times the probability that I misread it because it conflict wilt my previous belief, q, plus the probability
of the signal being incorrect, (1 − ϑ) which I always believe because it agrees with my previous believes.
θ∗∗ can be interpreted analogously.
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which are two relationships between ϑ and q. If q = 0 there is no confirmatory bias
and ϑ∗∗ =ϑ and ϑ∗ = 1 − ϑ . In this case the scientist has no confirmatory bias, s(he)
is a perfect Bayesian statistician and, according to Harsanyi, perfectly rational. How-
ever if q = 1, ϑ∗ =ϑ∗∗ = 1 the scientist beliefs are completely determined by the first
signal s(he) perceives, rightly or wrongly. First impression matter a lot and beliefs
cannot be changed by any posterior evidence conflicting with this first impression. We
could say that whenever q > 0 but q = 1 rationality is not perfect and this justifies
my calling this paper an exercise in bounded rationality.
Let us then examine the intermediate cases. Suppose the scientist has received nα
α-signals and nβ β-signals, nα > nβ . S(he) thinks s(he) has received nα a-signals and
nβ b-signals. Therefore starting from the a priori belief prob(x = A)= prob(x = B) =
0.5 s(he) has correctly updated to
prob
(
x = A/nα, nβ
) = ϑ
nα−nβ




x = B/nα, nβ
) = (1 − ϑ)
nα−nβ
ϑnα−nβ + (1 − ϑ)nα−nβ
such that we can define

(nα, nβ) = prob
(




x = B/nα, nβ
) = ϑ
nα−nβ
(1 − ϑ)nα−nβ ≶ 1.

 is a kind of likelihood ratio. If 
 > 1 the scientist thinks x = A is more likely
than x = B. If 
 < 1 the scientist thinks x = B is more liberty than x = A in
spite of the fact s(he) thinks s(he) has received more signals correlated with A than
signals correlated with B. Note now that 
(nα − nβ) depends on m = nα − nβ
and that this number does not coincide with m∗ = na − nb. It does however when
q = 0. In this case the perfect Bayesian statistician will calculate the likelihood ratio
as 
(na, nb) = 
∗(nα − nβ). The following result can now be established
Fact 1 (Overconfidence) If nα > nβ and nα + nβ > 1, then

∗(nα, nβ) < 
(nα, nβ).
Proof See (Rabin and Schrag, 1999, Proposition 1). 
unionsq
Interpretation. Whatever is the correctednes of the signal ϑ , if there is confirmatory
bias (q > 0) the scientist will be overconfident in his belief about which state of the
world, A or B, is more likely. His or her belief in favor of x = A (in favor of x being
true) is stronger than is justified by the available evidence.
This is the appropriate place to soften the apparent irritation of Mäki prompted by
McCloskey response in JEL to Mäki‘s diagnosis in this latter journal. In fact Mäki‘s
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sequel in the Journal of Economic Issues can be read as accusing McCloskey of violat-
ing Sprachethik. However if we think that confirmatory bias is a fact we cannot infer
dishonesty in McCloskey response but perhaps only some overconfidence completely
coherent with Sprachethik.
In any case the groundwork elaborated in this section will yield its fruit in the next
two, when confronting the issue of realism and elites.
5 On realism
If we want’ to discuss McCloskey’s claim of being a realist, and we want to discuss
it in terms of truth theory we should move to a correspondence theory of truth. In this
section we continue to make use of Rabin and Schrag (1999) results in order to show
that confirmatory bias might lead to entertaining false theories at least in probabilistic
terms and to eliminate possibilities of learning.
Let us first discuss the possibility of our scientist being wrong. As we already know
this scientist may think that the probability of x = A is μ > 0.5 when in fact it is
smaller than μ. S(he) is overconfident but s(he) can be said to be right if the true
probability of x = A is greater than 0.5. If in fact this true probability is less than 0.5
s(he) can be said to be wrong. Can s(he) be wrong in this sense? Yes if ϑ and q are
sufficiently close to one.
Fact 2 (Wrongness) There are values of ϑ and q close to one which, given
nα − nβ ≥ 2, yield 
∗(nα, nβ;ϑ, q) < 1.
Proof See (Rabin and Schrag, 1999, Proposition 2). 
unionsq
Interpretation. When confirmatory bias is very severe, q ≈ 1, and the signal is
very informative, ϑ ≈ 1, and the scientist has perceived one or none β signals s(he) is
probably correct in believing x = A. However when s(he) has received two or more
β signals s(he) is probably in correct in believing x = A because s(he) does so only
because the confirmatory bias is very severe. Therefore having received two or more
β signals is something very informative while receiving additional α signals is not
very informative because, with q ≈ 1, the very first α signal is the one that explains
why the scientist believes x = A.
Let us now turn to the possibility of learning. One might hope that, even when
having received a certain amount of evidence you are still wrong according to a cor-
respondence theory of truth, the observation of many additional signals will dissipate
your ignorance and you will end up learning the truth. Rabin and Schrag have shown
that this might not be the case.
Let Pw be the probability that although the true state is x = A, the scientist comes
to believe irreversibly with near certainty that x = B, starting from any belief. The
following fact means that there is a positive probability that this may happen.
Fact 3 (No learning) If q > 1 − 12ϑ , then Pw > 0.
Proof See (Rabin and Schrag, 1999, Proposition 4). 
unionsq
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Interpretation. Despite receiving an infinitive number of signals it may occur that
the scientist becomes almost sure that x = B when in fact x = A. This happens
when the quantitative relationships between q and ϑ (recall ϑ ∈ (0.5, 1)) is such
that ϑ∗ = (1 − ϑ) + qϑ > 0.5. When this is the case we already know that, once
the scientist has come to believe x = A, he is more likely to perceive confirmatory
evidence in favor of his or her incorrect beliefs than to perceive signals which conflict
with this incorrect belief.
These two last facts are direct consequences of the confirmatory bias, a trait of
the psychological personality which could very well be an evolutionary stable second
best adaptation under the force of natural selection as we have seen in Section 3. Be
as it may these results about wrongness and about learning problematize once more
the issue of realism. Now, it is not that expectations might in fact construct reality,
something I have discussed in my above-mentioned 1998 article, but rather that the
correspondence theory of truth is at stake in a certain sense. One can have a realist
conception of the world in the sense of believing in a world outside language (as
McCloskey confesses she really does: “I’m a realist” answers to Mäki) and one can
even, and correspondingly, wish to have a correspondence theory of truth (as Mäki
advises McCloskey to hold) and yet face the impossibility of entertaining such a theory
of truth just because the outside world may be completely inaccessible, a possibility
that the two results above appear to sustain.
Under these circumstances we might easily say that “correspondence” is an interest-
ing notion that however has to be considered inoperative. Then why should one not held
a coherence theory of truth? For one thing it is accessible precisely because confirma-
tory bias has no bite against it. One might even use a more forceful argument, namely
that coherence is the best strategy one may wait for in an open society so as to discover
the real underlying world. This argument deserves scrutiny but it has to wait to another
occasion. However some additional comments will be offered in the last section. In
any case it should be clear that this argument is not immune to confirmatory bias.
6 On elites
In order to complete my double aim in this paper I have to show that the social con-
straints represented by elites might not be binding in scientific conversations. For so
doing I continue to explore the consequences of confirmatory bias but now on how to
aggregate the information provided by experts each of which judges whether x = A
or x = B, i.e. whether theory x is true or false (without restricting these notions to any
correspondence with the underlying reality). Mäki notices in this respect that McClos-
key puts more strength on the opinions of members of a scientific elite which in his
case could be the Chicago type of economist or, more in general, the one belonging
to the neoclassical tradition. However, as we will see presently, it can be shown that,
under confirmatory bias, it is quite reasonable to pay attention to the majority of sci-
entists or experts without weighing their opinions according to belongingness to any
particular elite.
Just to be more precise, and because we are interested in Rhetoric as metatheory,
let us think of a Principal (be it the metatheorist or any scientific policy board) who
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must collect information regarding some particular theory from a set of scientists who
may be considered his Agents. Because these agents are subject to confirmatory bias
the optimal contract between Principal and Agents must not only take into account
the usual incentive compatibility constraint but must also “prevent decisions based on
good faith overconfidence” (Rabin and Schrag 1999, p. 63). In particular incentives
that increase the collection of a lot of information might not be desirable.
Suppose the Principal tries to allocate a given amount of money, W = 1, among
three different theories, TA, TB and TC . Theory TC is conventional wisdom and we
can say that the “returns” of “investing” W on it are given by r(TC ) = 1 with complete
certainty. However the other two theories are “risky” and their “returns” depend on
the sate of nature x ∈ {A, B} in the following way: r(TA/A) = r(TB/B) ∈ (1, 2) and
r(TA/B) = r(TB/A) = 0. The Principal has a conventional Von-Newman-Morgen-
stern utility exhibiting risk aversion and considers the possibility of asking an expert
or a scientist about the most convenient allocation of W = 1 among the three theories.
Principal and Agent share the common prior belief that prob(x = A) = prob(x =
B) = 0.5. It is clear that if the Agent has no further information he will recommend
TC ; but if s(he) gathers additional information that changes his or her a priori belief
about the state of nature s(he) will recommend one of the risky theories.
The problem is how to incentivate the Agent. To be concrete suppose that the Agent
has no cost of gathering information and that s(he) is completely risk averse. In these
conditions the Principal has to pay the Agent a fixed amount and, however small, if it
is positive the agent will gather an infinite number of observations. Therefore we only
have two possibilities. Either the Principal pays no incentive and then, as mentioned,
TC is selected. Or the Principal pays a certain amount and the agent gather lots of
information. In this latter case we now from Fact 3 that the Agent might be wrong
even after gathering all the new observations. It has been shown by Rabin and Schrag





2(ϑ + q(1 − ϑ) − 1)
](
1 − ϑ + qϑ)
q
[
1 − 2(1 − q)ϑ(1 − ϑ)
]
which is increasing in ϑ and decreasing in q. Therefore the Principal’s expected pay-off
is
Eu∗ = μ∗(ϑ, q)u(R) + (1 − μ∗(ϑ, q))u(o)
where u(R) and u(o) are the utility level of income R or income zero, and s (he)
does not want the Agent to gather information when u(1) ≥ Eu∗. Define now μ as
the value of μ∗ satisfying u(1) = μu(R) + (1 − μ)u(o). Since μ∗(ϑ, q) ≥ 0 the
Principal offers an incentive for the Agent to get informed if and only if ϑ ≥ μ. That
is there is always a high enough q and a small enough ϑ which make not paying any
incentive the optimal choice. The intuition is quite obvious, in any of these two cases
the probability of being wrong is very high.
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Given this intuition it should also be intuitive that if the Principal has to allocate a
given amount of signals he wants to gather among several agents the more Agents the
better, since each agent will be less likely to be carried away by his or her confirmatory
bias. The next step is to think about how to weigh the information of each agent once
the number of agents has been decided but the number of signals gathered by each
agent is unknown. Rabin and Schrag (1999) give the following example. Suppose the
correctness of the signal is given by ϑ = 0.6. There are three Agents. Suppose first
that they were perfect Bayesian statisticians. Two of three agents report believing in
TA with probability 0.6 (meaning that each of them has received 2 more times signals
a than signals b) and one agent reports believing in TB with probability 0.77 (meaning
that he has received three more b-signals than a-signals). The Principal in this case
should believe in TB with probability 0.6. That is s(he) should pay attention to the
“strength” of the agents beliefs perhaps weighing more heavily the believes of agents
who are more experienced or belong to any kind of elite. What if the Principal knows
that the agents are subject to confirmatory bias? In this case Rabin and Schrag discuss
the case and come up with the following statement “If confirmatory bias is so severe
that only an agent’s first signal is very informative, then the Principal may wish to dis-
count the strength of agents’ beliefs and basically aggregate according to a ‘majority
rules criterion’ ” (p. 69).
It seems quite safe to say that under the conditions of this section the greater the
number of scientists consulted the better and that there are no elites the opinion of
which is more heavily weighted than that of non members of the elite. Scientific con-
versations might not be socially constrained and hence postmodernism might not be
excluded from Rhetoric since all participants in the conversation might be on an equal
footing. This reinforces Mäki’s first proposal.9
7 Conclusions and final comments
This paper has articulated a second best analysis of a situation quite far from one of
perfect rationality. Confirmatory bias can be thought of as a second best adaptation
to the forces of natural selection and can also be an evolutionary stable strategy so
that it is here to stay as seems to be supported by several psychological experiments.
But once confirmatory bias is at work it is quite clear that economic agents in gen-
eral or scientists in particular do not act as perfectly rational in the sense that they
do no mimic the behavior of a Bayesian statistician. Combining second best theory
and not perfect rationality—or bounded rationality—is not staple stock in Economics.
However it seems appropriate to the field of Rhetoric. Quite intuitively, there does
not appear to be any room for rhetoric when rationality is perfect and first best is
attainable. Persuasion should be automatic and direct in such a world.
This kind of analysis has yielded three main results. First honesty and open, power-
free, conversations may not preclude systematic error in appreciation of theories.
9 In this sense it is worth mentioning that Klamer’s (1983) Conversation with Economists is rather post-
modernist in the sense that he gives equal voice to all sorts of economists. However postmodernism is a
larger issue that would deserve additional distinctions between relativism and pluralism for instance. The
distinction between dialogue and performance made by Mäki (2000) has also bearing on the issue.
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Therefore the moral constraint supposedly operating on the opinions of scientists
might not be binding in the sense that their opinions might look completely anarchis-
tic. Second the social constraint might also be not binding because each scientist’s
opinion carries the same weight regardless of fame or honor, a very postmodern sit-
uation. Third, one can be a supporter of the correspondence theory of truth, one can
have no doubts about the existence of an independent underlying real world and yet
one might be obliged to accept that an honest and informed conversation may lead to
the acceptance of false theories.
These three results obtained in a certain environment sustain the three broad com-
ments I advanced before. First, they give Mäki additional reasons to exclude angels
and elites from Rhetoric although these reasons also support a coherence theory of
truth something presumably Mäki will not like. Second the compatibility of angels and
elites with anarchism, postmodernism (and of course realism) can yield an alternative
diagnosis of McCloskey (more anarchist and postmodernist than Mäki would concede)
more attuned to her proclaimed realism. Third the compatibility of anarchism, post-
modernism and realism among themselves makes room for wrongness and absence
of learning and these in turn cast doubts on the necessity of maintaining angels and
elites in the coherence theory of justification.10
These conclusions may appear as sustaining a rather severe semantic pessimism (or
at least skepticism) quite attuned to the present state of Economics. With some final
comments about this point I close this essay.
Semantic matters would look even gloomy if we add strategic considerations in
relation to the behavior of scientists. My colleague Jesús Zamora have written on this.
Zamora (1999) has described how consensus might be reached among scientists and
how this consensus might be objective in the sense that scientist will not misrepre-
sent opinions but will tell the truth. However, additional considerations of information
cascades or rumors might lead to clusters of opinion completely unrelated to truth as
correspondence of opinions with underlying reality.
Even if we assume away strategic considerations we have to confront the issue of
whether the “market for ideas” might lead to the discovery of truth under confirmatory
bias. The point is, however, that even if the severity of the problem were nil and even
if moral constraints would underlie the market and social constraints would facilitate
its functioning, the market for ideas might not work because increasing rectums to
scale are very common when ideas are involved. Furthermore if we took into account
strategic behavior, incentive compatibility and efficiency would require perfect com-
petition understood as Makowski and Ostroy (2001) understand it, that is requiring full
appropriation something almost incompatible with difficult appropriability of ideas.
If in addition we included confirmatory bias it appears quite impossible to rely on the
“market” as a way of reaching truth, given wrongness for instance.
In fact strategic behavior and confirmatory bias together would pose serious puzzles.
Consider the following. Confirmatory bias might lead to every scientist to stick to its
10 This compatibility may deprive Mäki of any consolation to his irritation about two of McCloskey’s
presumed inconsistencies. May be McCloskey when not really answering Mäki is not being dishonest,
she might be subject to a very simple and common confirmatory bias. When McCloskey indulges in an
unwarranted defense of neoclassical or Chicago Economics she might be misreading the evidence.
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own theory and we might not discover any majority. Since majority is the only way we
have to justify our beliefs under confirmatory bias we may want to penalize this egoic
behavior somehow. But such an incentive scheme might generate strange dynamics
specially if information flows according to rumors or cascades. (see Banerjee (1993)
and Bikhchandani et al. (1992)). There are chances that clusters of false opinions might
dictate what is true.
In conclusion, one cannot be very optimistic about the possibility that a coherence
theory of truth, even including elites and angels, could be a good strategy to attain truth
in a correspondence sense. The promising strategy is to study alternative imperfect
social decision arrangements for their relative characteristics in relation to errors in
acceptance of false theories or to errors in the rejection of true theories. What can be
done is to apply to this end the literature on the architecture of imperfect economic
systems initiated by Sah and Stiglitz (1988) under the possibility of confirmatory bias.
Something I did in “La Potencia Semántica de la Retórica” Urrutia (2003).
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